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Valorization 
Capital markets are the foundation of today’s economies. In order for firms to produce 
goods and services that are valuable to society, these firms need funding. This can be 
acquired at capital markets, where investors choose firms to invest in, hoping that they 
will receive a return on their investments. Yet, investors need credible information 
about firms in order to understand the business concepts and associated risks of the 
firms they would like to invest in. As investors often lose money if they have invested 
in firms that file for bankruptcy, a particularly important question is whether a firm is 
likely to continue as a going-concern, i.e. whether it is likely to operate in the 
foreseeable future and survive the next fiscal year. Firms who would like to acquire 
financing therefore have incentives to publish information about their past performance 
as well as the prospects of their firm in order to convince investors that their firm is a 
good investment. Yet, firms are unwilling to disclose information that could harm their 
competitive position. Moreover, there are some challenges for investors to evaluate the 
publicly disclosed information. First, firms have incentives to present themselves 
favorably and it is thus questionable whether investors can trust the presented 
information. Secondly, even if the information itself is trustworthy, investors often lack 
the necessary time and skills to evaluate the information.  
In order to address the first issue, regulators have stipulated rules to ensure that the 
information provided by firms is credible. One of these rules is that auditors need to 
attest whether the information presented in the annual financial report is reflective of the 
underlying firm situation and whether the company is likely to continue to operate in 
the foreseeable future. If the firm is unlikely to survive the next fiscal year, auditors are 
required to issue a going-concern opinion (GCO). The challenge for firms to 
communicate their quality without losing their competitive advantage is remediated by 
other third party information intermediaries. While firms are hesitant to disclose 
sensitive information publicly, they are often willing to provide access to information 
intermediaries, like credit rating agencies, who can then publish a summary assessment 
of the firm’s quality to investors without releasing the underlying proprietary 
information directly. Given the reputation of the information intermediary and the 
assessment of the firm, investors thereby acquire credible information about a firm’s 
prospects. Besides information intermediaries with access to proprietary information, 
other information intermediaries exist, such as equity analysts, that do not have access 
to proprietary information, but their experience and expertise as well as their coverage 
of entire industries, allows them to provide investors with an expert opinion regarding 
the future prospects of a firm. Information intermediaries also solve the issue that 
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investors lack time and skills to evaluate firms themselves as investors can incorporate 
the professional assessment of these information intermediaries in their decision.  
The information intermediaries that are examined in detail in this dissertation are 
mainly auditors and credit rating agencies. Auditors are required to provide investors 
with an annual assessment whether the assumption that the assessed firm is likely to be 
able to continue to operate in the next fiscal year is viable. If the auditor believes that 
this assumption is violated, they issue a going-concern opinion. Besides the going-
concern opinion that provides an assessment regarding the firm’s future health, other 
information intermediaries exist that also provides signals regarding a firm’s health. 
Credit rating agencies for example, evaluate the likelihood that a firm is able and 
willing to repay its debt in accordance with the terms of this debt. Their assessment is 
summarized and communicated via a credit rating. If a firm is unlikely to survive the 
next fiscal year, it is also unlikely that the firm will be able to repay all its debt and the 
credit rating is most likely downgraded. Besides auditors and credit rating agencies, one 
chapter of this dissertation additionally considers another type of information 
intermediaries, namely equity analysts. Equity analysts also gather and analyze 
information about a firm and communicate their assessment about the prospects of the 
firm via investment recommendations, earnings forecasts and target price forecasts. If a 
firm’s performance is deteriorating, analysts usually communicate this via negative 
investment recommendations or downward revisions of forecasts.  
To date, extensive research exists that analyses how different information 
intermediaries and their signals directly impact the behavior by stakeholders internal or 
external to firms. Questions that are frequently addressed are for example, how 
information is disseminated by firms themselves and how investors, i.e. shareholders 
and creditors, react to such information. Another question that has been examined in 
depth in the academic literature is how market participants react to information that is 
provided by information intermediaries. However, questions that have not been 
examined extensively and that are therefore addressed in this dissertation are what the 
effect is that information intermediaries have on each other and whether and how 
investors react to these interactions.  
The results of this dissertation imply that auditors incorporate credit ratings by 
professional credit rating agencies into their assessment whether the firm will continue 
to operate in the foreseeable future and alter their behavior to issue going-concern 
opinions in response to recent credit rating downgrades. This finding is examined in 
more detail in a later chapter of the dissertation and the results seem to be driven by the 
fact that auditors become more conservative as a result of a recent credit rating 
downgrade. This seems only natural because a more conservative assessment reduces 
the likelihood of potential lawsuits against the auditor. While credit ratings overall seem 
to increase auditor conservatism and do not necessarily improve the auditor’s 
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assessment, auditors without expertise in their client’s industry seem to benefit from 
credit rating changes as they are less likely to misjudge whether the firm is likely to 
continue operating beyond the next fiscal year when a credit rating change precedes. 
Besides considering the impact of these information intermediaries on each other, this 
dissertation also examines whether investors’ reaction to the auditor’s assessment is 
different depending on preceding signals by other information intermediaries. The 
results suggest that equity investors continue to value the auditor’s assessment regarding 
a firm’s future viability, even if it is preceded by signals from other information 
intermediaries like credit rating agencies and equity analysts that provide similar 
information. Only when these other signals are without ambiguity that a firm is unlikely 
to survive the next fiscal year, is the auditor’s assessment not valued anymore.  
These findings do not only provide an academic contribution, but they are 
moreover relevant for multiple public debates and therefore also to regulators. First, the 
auditor’s report has been criticized for its lack of timeliness because it is only published 
on an annual basis. Opponents have argued that there are more timely indicators and 
that the auditor’s assessment regarding the viability of firms is therefore redundant. Yet, 
the findings of this dissertation show that investors value the information provided by 
the auditor even if other professional information intermediaries, like credit rating 
agencies and equity analysts, provide more timely signals regarding a firm’s future 
viability. This is interesting for regulators because it clearly shows that the auditor’s 
opinion is not redundant and regulators might want to consider this in future regulatory 
changes.  
Secondly, the auditor’s assessment whether the company is likely to survive the 
next fiscal year has been criticized for its binary nature and its standardized wording. 
The findings of this dissertation show that investors value specifically this assessment. 
While there are other indications about a firm’s future prospects that are not of binary 
nature, investors seem to derive value from the auditor’s assessment because of its 
binary nature and standardized wording as exactly this seems to reduce ambiguity. This 
is also relevant for regulators with respect to the current debate regarding whether and 
how to restructure the auditor’s report. Based on requests from stakeholders, 
particularly investors and financial statement analysts, to improve the informativeness 
of the auditor’s report, the International Auditing and Assurance Standard Board 
(IAASB) is currently considering to restructure the auditor’s report. More particularly, 
investors and financial statement users argue that the auditor’s report is the only means 
by which auditors can communicate information about a firm to the public and therefore 
it would be helpful if the auditor’s report would have more information. While the 
findings of this dissertation do not provide an assessment regarding whether the audit 
report should include more information or not, the findings show that it is important to 
maintain the clear format of the auditor’s opinion regarding the future viability of a 
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firm. This confirms the decision of the IAASB to add additional information to the 
auditor’s report but to keep the unambiguous nature of the going-concern opinion.  
Another public debate that is currently taking place is the role of credit ratings. 
Until the recent financial crisis, credit ratings were considered important information 
tools regarding firms’ creditworthiness. They were not only used as guide concerning 
which firms to invest in by investors, but they were also incorporated in several capital 
market regulations. While an extensive stream of literature examines the role of credit 
ratings to investors and to firms, few research exists so far that considers the role of 
credit ratings for other information intermediaries, such as auditors. Given the auditor’s 
litigation concerns and the fact that the assessment whether the firm is viable in the near 
future are often difficult, it seems only likely that auditors use other available 
information in their assessments. The findings of this dissertation show a clear 
association between credit rating changes and auditor’s assessment regarding the future 
viability of those firms. This is important to consider for regulators as well, as it shows 
that changes to regulations of credit ratings might also indirectly affect auditors’ 
actions. It is particularly important to understand that recent credit rating downgrades 
seem to increase auditor conservatism. Regulatory changes applicable to credit rating 
agencies to adapt credit ratings more quickly or to provide more conservative ratings, 
would likely result in auditors becoming more conservative overall as the findings of 
this dissertation imply. This is critical as this dissertation suggests that auditors 
occasionally become too conservative and regulators might want to consider the trade-
off between more timely and more conservative credit ratings on the one hand and a 
side effect of more volatile ratings and potentially too conservative audit reports on the 
other hand.  
Besides the implications for regulators, the findings of this dissertation are also 
relevant for auditors. This dissertation shows a strong association between credit rating 
downgrades and an auditor’s propensity to issue going-concern opinions. It is important 
for auditors to understand how their decision is being affected by credit rating agencies 
and how credit rating agencies arrive at their rating. This is particularly relevant in light 
of the finding that auditors become more careful but not necessarily better in a going-
concern assessment that follows a credit rating downgrade. The additional analyses with 
respect to auditors without expertise in their client’s industry might be interesting and 
helpful for these auditors because it seems as if these auditor can derive additional 
information from credit rating changes and therefore improve their likelihood to give an 
assessment that is ex post identified as correct. Auditors should be aware of how their 
judgment is influenced by other information intermediaries in order to ensure that their 
decision regarding the assessment of the firm’s future viability is indeed a conscious 
and hopefully optimal one. 
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Moreover, the findings are relevant to credit rating agencies themselves as it is 
important that they do not only understand the direct effects that their credit rating 
actions and reports have but also the indirect implications that their actions have on the 
end consumer of their reports via other market participants. Previous research has 
shown that investors react to changes in credit ratings immediately. Additionally, this 
dissertation implies that audit reports are also affected by credit rating changes. This 
means that investors are affected by credit rating changes directly but also indirectly via 
audit reports. Credit rating agencies need to be aware of these implications in order to 
ensure that their rating actions have indeed the intended consequences.  
Last but not least, this dissertation might be useful to the users of audit reports and 
credit ratings. Clearly, there are implications for equity investors that decide whether 
they want to invest in a firm or not. For them it is relevant to be informed if a firm 
cannot continue to operate. It might therefore be interesting to understand how the 
auditor’s decision whether to issue a going-concern opinion or not is influenced by 
actions from credit rating agencies. This is potentially particularly important in 
situations in which an auditor might be too conservative because investors might end up 
withdrawing their investments at a loss while it might not have been necessary (yet). 
Other users of audit reports such as a firm’s creditors, employees, customers or 
suppliers might also find this interesting and relevant.  
The increased awareness amongst all stakeholders – including regulators, auditors, 
credit rating agencies, and investors– to understand the indirect effects that signals by 
different information intermediaries have on each other might help to improve 
stakeholder actions and could thereby make capital markets overall more efficient. 
  
